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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
O,F THE STATE OF UTAH 
BETIT J. WICKES, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
COMP ANY, an Illinois corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
12598 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing 
and Supporting Brief 
Plaintiff and Appellant, Betty ]. Wickes, by and through 
her counsel of record and pursuant to Rule 7 6 ( e), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, respectfully petitions this Honorable Court 
for a rehearing in the above-entitled cause upon the ground 
that the decision rendered by the Court on April 17, 1972 is in 
error insofar as it rejects Appellant's claim as set forth under 
Point III in Appellant's Brief. 
WHEREFORE, Appellant requests that a rehearing be 
granted and that the Court re-examine the law and the record 
1 
and reverse the lower court judgment and direct that judg-
ment be entered in favor of the Appellant. 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
By -- ---- -- ------ ---- ------ --- -- ----- --- -- -------- ------- --
Allan L. Larson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
7th Floor Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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IN THE SUPRElv!E COURr-f 
OF rfHE STATE OF UTAH 
BETTY J. WICKES, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL 
AUiOMOBILE INSURANCE 
COMP ANY, an Illinois corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
12598 
Brief in Support of Appellant's 
P·etition for Rehearing 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT'S OPINION IN REGARD TO 
POINT III OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF IS 
IN ERROR AS TO THE FACTS AND THE LAW 
Point III of the Appellant's Brief was that the acceptance 
of the premium by the defendant insurance company after 
notice of the loss constituted a waiver of the timely payment 
of the premium and thus coverage existed for the death of 
Homer Wickes. 
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In rejecting this argument of the Appellant, the Court 
observes in its opinion that that argument is not appropriate 
since the premium was not paid within ten days after the policy 
lapsed, and that "hence the policy by its terms was not effec-
tive until the date when the premium was received by the 
defendant." The opinion goes on to state that "the 40-day 
provision of the policy governs here, and the policy only be-
came effective August 18, 1969 .... " It is respectfully sub-
mitted that this interpretation of the record is in error. The 
policy itself provided that it terminated automatically if a 
premium was not received by the due date, either February 1 
or August 1. The only document wherein it is set forth that 
the policy is continuous if the premium is received within ten 
days, or is reinstated if the premium is received within 40 days, 
is the premium notice, unsigned by any agent or representative 
of the company. Nowhere does the policy state that coverage 
will be continuous if the premium is received within ten days, 
or that the policy will be reinstated if the premium is re-
ceived within 40 days. This fact is the very heart of the Ap-
pellant's argument in Point III. 
Any statements made by Mr. Starbuck to James Wickes, 
or any representations or terms as set forth on the unsigned 
premium notice, are irrelevant. The policy of insurance pro-
vided that the terms thereof could not be changed except by 
an endorsement signed by an officer of the insurance com-
pany. The "10-40 notice" does not meet that requirement. 
Section 31-19-26 and Section 31-19-20, Utah Code Anno-
tated ( 1953) provide that no modification of an insurance 
contract shall be effective unless in writing and containing 
at least a facsimile signature of the insurer or an officer thereof· 
The "10-40 notice" does not meet those requirements. 
The Court's opinion states that the provisions of an in-
surance policy must be enforced as written, and cannot be 
changed or modified in favor of the insured except by a writ-
ing signed by the insurer, and that no such writing was ever 
made by the defendant in this case. The Court's opinion is in-
ternally inconsistent in that it states that the provisions of the 
policy must govern, but then goes on to say that a ten-day pro-
vision, or a 40-day provision, completely outside the terms 
of the policy, must be given effect. The law is clear, however, 
that the "10-40 notice" cannot vary the terms of the policy. 
Thus, the only issue to be decided is the legal effect of the 
acceptance of the $48.00 premium by the insurance com-
pany after it had notice of the death of Homer Wickes. "That 
insurance co1upanies may waive prompt payment of policies, 
although such payment is of the essence of the contract of in-
surance . . . is too well settled to admit of dispute." Loftis v. 
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company of California, 114 P. 
134, 38 Utah 532 (1911). 
The general rule was also stated in Sztllivan v. Beneficial 
Life Insurance Company, 64 P.2d 351, 91 Utah 405 (1937) 
wherein the Court stated that "where there has been a default 
in the payment of a premium ... justifying a forfeiture of 
the contract such forfeiture is waived if, with knowledge of 
' 
all the facts, the insurer, either before or after the death of the 
insured, unconditionally accepts and retains the specific pre-
mium or assessment for which the insured was delinquent" 
(emphasis added) . 
The general view, including that of the Utah Supreme 
Court, is that acceptance of a past-due premium after knowl-
edge of the loss constitutes a waiver of the timely payment of 
the premium. An extensive collection of cases expressing that 
view is found in 7 A.L.R. 3d 414. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held many times that an 
insurance company cannot treat a policy as being in effect 
for the purpose of collecting premiums but then claim that it 
was not in effect for purposes of meeting its obligations there-
under. Parker v. California State Life Insurance Company, 40 
P.2d 175, 85 Utah 595 ( 1935); Farrington v. Granite State 
Fire Insurance Company, 232 P.2d 754, 120 Utah 109 ( 1951). 
It is clear from the record that the defendant insurance com-
pany continued to collect premiums even after August 1, 1969. 
In fact, the "10-40 notice" was not even mailed from the de· 
fondant's office until the third day after the policy had allegedly 
expired. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Appellant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. By its terms the policy ex-
pired on August 1. The defendant continued thereafter to 
attempt to collect the premium which should have been paid 
on August 1. The defendant at all times knew that Homer 
Wickes had been killed in an automobile accident. The Appel-
lant finally did pay the premium and the company accepted it. 
The law is clear that such a state of facts constitutes a waiver 
of the timely payment of the premium and that coverage is 
extended for a loss, occurring during the interim, of which the 
defendant had know ledge. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court erred in its 
assi.:mption that the "ten day" and ''40-day" provisions were 
found in the policy. In fact, the record is clear that such pro-
visions are found only in a premium notice, which premium 
notice cannot vary the terms of the policy itself. It is clear 
that the actions of the defendant in accepting the past-due 
premium with knowledge of the loss entitle the Appellant to 
judgment as a matter of law. The Court should reverse the 
judgment in favor of the Defendant and direct that judgment 
be entered in favor of the Plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted this ____________ day of ----------·--·------, 
1972. 
WORSLEY, SNOW & 
CHRISTENSEN 
By-------------------·----------------------··----
Allan L. Larson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
7th Floor Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing 
brief to David K. Winder at 604 Boston Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah on this ____________ day of --------------------·-------, 1972. 
---------------------- ------------------------------
Allan L. Larson 
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